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Abstract 
Poverty and informal employment are often regarded as correlated phenomena. Many 
empirical  studies  have  shown  that  informal  employment  has  a  causal  impact  on 
household poverty, mainly through low wages. Yet other studies focus on the reverse 
causality from poverty to informality, arising from a range of constraints that poverty 
poses  to  job  holders.  Only  recently  have  empirical  researchers  tried  to  study  the 
simultaneous  two-way  relationship  between  poverty  and  informality.  However, 
existing studies have relied upon cross sectional data and static econometric models. 
This paper takes the next step and studies the dynamics of poverty and informality 
using longitudinal data. Our empirical analysis is based on a bivariate dynamic random 
effect probit model and recent panel data from Argentina. The results show that both 
poverty and informal employment are highly persistent processes at the individual 
level. Moreover, positive spillover effects are found from past poverty on current 
informal  employment  and  from  past  informality  to  current  poverty  status, 
corroborating  the  view  that  the  two  processes  are  also  shaped  by  interrelated 
dynamics. 
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1. Introduction 
The  persistence  of  high  levels  of  informality  and  poverty  in  Argentina  is  a  feature 
shared  by  many  developing  countries  in  the  Latin  American  region.  The  nature  of 
informality is a matter of controversy, which is partly related to the heterogeneity of the 
economic activities typically included in the informal sector (ILO, 2002). One of the 
most  debated  feature  of  informality  lies  in  the  role  it  can  have  in  economic 
development, and within this debate a primary place is occupied by the study of the 
relationship between informal jobs and poverty (World Bank, 2006). The fact that a 
large  part  of the informal  workers  are poor, and vice versa, supports the view that 
poverty and informality are connected. Poverty comprises those households below a 
certain income line. Informality, on the other side, includes a large fraction of workers 
with  low  earnings.  Hence,  low  incomes  appear  as  the  link  relating  informality  and 
poverty. Although there is some consensus around this asseveration there is still scarce 
evidence about the interactions between the two phenomena.  
 
The analysis of the relationship between poverty and informality allows disentangling 
the reasons that lead certain individuals to engage in informal employment. According 
to the supply-led view, workers voluntarily opt for jobs in the informal sector given 
their preferences and productivity (e.g., Heckman and Sedlacek, 1985). According to an 
alternative demand-led view, work in the informal sector is instead the consequence of 
the lack of opportunities for accessing to a formal job. A host of institutional barriers 
and labor regulations may segment labor markets into a formal sector offering high-
quality jobs and an informal sector offering second-choice jobs, typically characterized 
by lower wages, poorer working conditions and poorer career prospects than in the 
formal sector (e.g., Fields, 1975). In this perspective, employment in the informal sector 
is mainly driven by firms’ demand for a cheaper form a labor input and workers’ need 
to  work  to  sustain  their  household  necessities.  
Unlike the supply-led view, the demand-led view emphasize the involuntary nature of 
informality, rather than workers’ preference for this type of employment. In this respect, 
the inability to cover minimum household food, clothing, shelter and fuel requirements, 
coupled with the difficulty to get a job in the formal sector, may explain individual’s 
decision to look for a job in the informal sector (Amuendo-Dorantes, 2004). In other 
words, the involuntary view of informality opens the way for household poverty to be a   2
crucial  determinant  of  informality,  rather  than  simply  being  one  of  its  unpleasant 
implications. 
 
The identification of poverty as one of the negative consequences of informality is quite 
widespread in the literature. Informality may be one of the causes of poverty if informal 
jobs are associated with low incomes. Therefore, an important bulk of the research has 
centered  on  the  empirical  evaluation  of  the  existence  of  an  earnings  gap  between 
formality and informality. Another strand of research has instead focused on the link 
between household poverty and informality, and this is the focus of the present paper. 
Modeling  the  interrelated  dynamics  between  poverty  and  informality  can  be  quite 
challenging, especially because household poverty is related to the labor market choices 
and outcomes of each household member. Our strategy to circumvent this complexity is 
to restrict our empirical analysis to a sample of household heads. Our main justification 
for doing so is that household heads’ earnings comprise a rather significant fraction of 
household incomes. Note that, even with this restricted focus, the poverty implications 
of an informal sector job can come about as a combination of low unit wages and high 
instability of the household head’s job.  
 
Less explored is the inverse relationship, from poverty to informality. Indeed, the fact 
that  the  head  of  a  poor  household  faces  a  greater  chance  to  engage  in  informal 
employment  with  respect  to  a  non-poor  head  sustains  a  vision  that  emphasizes  the 
involuntary nature of informality. The impossibility of getting a formal job (in a dual 
labor market well-paid jobs are scarce), usually with high and more stable incomes 
comparing  to  those  from  informal  jobs,  may  lead  to  enter  into  informality.  This  is 
regularly the only alternative to unemployment in the absence of generalized social 
security networks, a characteristic of Latin American countries. Poor household heads 
usually cannot afford the entry costs in the formal sector and cannot wait until a formal 
job offer materializes; their household immediate necessities make the take-up of an 
informal job a survival, albeit second-best, choice. A number of factors associated with 
the  condition  of  poverty  (i.e.  residential  segregation,  spatial  labor  mismatch,  labor 
discrimination)  may  make  the  prospects  of  a  formal  job  even  less  likely.  Hence, 
informality would be the result of some poverty attributes.  
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This paper contributes to the analysis of the interaction between informality and poverty 
by  providing  evidence  for  the  Argentinean  case.  Only  recently  have  empirical 
researchers tried to study the simultaneous two-way relationship between poverty and 
informality. However, existing studies have relied upon cross sectional data and static 
econometric models. This paper takes the next step and studies the dynamics of poverty 
and informality using longitudinal data. The interconnection between informality and 
poverty that we aim at exploring is arguably dynamic in nature. In particular, we are 
interested in whether having been employed in an informal job in the past may lead to 
poverty  in  the  future.  Similarly,  we  would  like  to  know  whether  having  suffered 
episodes of poverty may lead to episodes of informality hereafter.  
 
Our empirical analysis is based on a bivariate dynamic random effect probit model and 
panel  data  covering  the  period  1996-2003.  The  results  show  that  both  poverty  and 
informal employment are highly persistent processes at the individual level. Moreover, 
positive spillover effects are found from past poverty on current informal employment 
and from past informality to current poverty status, corroborating the view that the two 
processes are also shaped by interrelated dynamics in segmented labor markets.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes previous research and 
section 3 the definitions and data used. Section 4 provides descriptive evidence about 
informality and poverty in Argentina.  Section 5 presents the econometric approach. 
Section 6 analyzes the results and section 7 discusses additional methodological issues. 
The conclusions are presented in section 8. 
 
2. Previous research   
Several  studies  confirm  the  persistence  of  high  rates  of  informal  employment  and 
poverty in Latin America (Perry et al., 2007; Worldbank, 2006). However, research 
about  the  connection  between  informality  and  poverty  is  insufficient.  Analyses  of 
poverty dynamics are usually concerned with patterns and determinants of transitions 
and  persistence.  In  general,  results  are  that  movements  in  and  out  of  poverty  are 
frequently  associated  with  changes  in  employment  status.  Gasparini  and  Tornaroli 
(2007)  found  that  on  average  the  difference  in  the  poverty  headcount  ratio  between 
informal and formal workers is around 4 times in the region. Amuedo-Dorantes (2004) 
using  cross-section  data  for  Chile  concludes  that  household  poverty  increases  the   4
likelihood  of  employment  in  the  informal  sector.  Also,  it  is  shown  that  having  an 
informal job raises the probability of becoming poor. Beccaria and Groisman (2008) 
explore if informality is the main cause of Argentinean poverty and find that, although 
relevant,  the  later  one  is  not  limited  to  households  with  members  working  in  the 
informal sector.  
 
There  is a  second group  of research interests  that is related to informality and low 
labour incomes. As it  was  mentioned  above, these are analyses oriented  to test the 
existence of segmented labor markets. The usual methodological approach consists on 
isolating the effect of informality from those derived from other income-determinants 
variables. Both parametric and semi-parametric methods can be found in various studies 
for different countries: Maloney (1999) for Mexico, Packard (2007) for Chile, Pratap 
and Quintin (2006) and Beccaria and Groisman (2008) for Argentina and World Bank 
(2007)  for  various  Latin  American  countries.  From  a  different  methodological 
perspective Sosa Escudero and Arias (2008) analyze the interrelation between labor 
informality  and  relative  informal/formal  wages  in  Argentina.  Although  most  of  the 
papers find a formality premium, especially among wage earners, the reasons for being 
informal remain polemical.  
 
As  for  the  research  on  the  dynamics  of  poverty,  many  different  methodological 
approaches have been used in the literature (Aassve et al., 2005). First, some papers 
have used components of variance models to capture the dynamics of income using a 
complex error structure (i.e. Lillard and Willis, 1978; Stevens, 1999 and Devicienti, 
2001). These models are able to predict the fraction of population likely to be in poverty 
for different lengths of time. One shortcoming of these models is that they typically 
assume that the dynamics of the income process is identical for all individuals in the 
sample, rich and poor, which does not seem to match reality (Stevens, 1999; Devicienti, 
2001).  
 
Another  strand  of  research  has  focused  on  the  estimation  of  Markovian  transition 
poverty models (first order Markov models) taking simultaneously into account that 
individuals are not randomly distributes either within the poor at first interview - initial 
conditions problem - or within the effectively observed at second interview - attrition 
problem  –(i.e.  Capellari and  Jenkins, 2004). Alternatively, if the first-order Markov   5
assumption is violated, a long-standing approach to model poverty transitions has been 
the use of duration models in a hazard rate framework (i.e. Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 
1980; Allison, 1982; Ducan, 1984; Bane and Ellwood, 1986; Jenkins, 1995; Devicienti, 
2001; Hansen and Wahlberg, 2004; Biewen, 2006; Arranz and Canto, 2008).  
 
Third, some recent approaches to the analysis of poverty transitions have used binary 
dependent variable dynamic random effects models where an individual’s poverty status 
at time t is assumed to depend on the same individual’s poverty status at t-1, a list of 
covariates and  some  unobserved  individual effects.  In  this  case  state  dependence is 
summarized by the coefficient estimated for lagged poverty. In this type of models the 
distribution  of  the  unobserved  effects  is  conditional  on  the  initial  value  of  poverty 
(initial conditions) and a group of exogenous variables. See Wooldridge (2005) and, for 
examples of this approach to the analysis of poverty, see Poggi (2007) and Biewen 
(2008).  Moreover,  this  type  of  models  can  be  extended  to  analyze  the  relationship 
between  two  supposedly  related  concepts  (i.e.  poverty  and  informal  employment). 
Devicienti and Poggi (2007) propose the use of a dynamic random effects bivariate 
probit following the recent contribution by Stewart (2007) who generalizes Wooldridge 
(2005) to the bivariate case.  
 
3. Data  
The  data  used  in  this  document  come  from  the  household  survey  from  Argentina 
(Permanent Household Survey –PHS– carried out by INDEC). Panel data is obtained 
from the rotating panel used to conform the sample of households interviewed. The 
survey covers urban areas and collects information on labour market variables, income 
and other social dimensions. Household and individual data are collected. Interviews are 
held  two  times  a  year  (in  May  and  in  October).  Households  are  visited  in  four 
successive moments or waves through a period of 18 months. Data for all urban areas 
are available from 1996. The questionnaires and methods of the PHS were modified in 
2003. For that reason we focus on the period 1996 to 2003. Our unit of the analysis is 
the household head.  
 
4. Informality and Poverty Trends  
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From mid-1970s to 1990 Argentina experienced a 15-year period of macroeconomic 
instability  and  productive  stagnation.  Gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  was  broadly 
unchanged throughout that period and inflation remained at high levels. This process 
culminated in the hyperinflationary crisis of 1989 and 1990. In 1991 a stabilization 
programme based on economic openness was implemented and led to an increase in 
GDP. The Mexican crisis in  late 1994  impacted on Argentina  though the recession 
associated with this event was brief. From 1996 to 1998 the economy resumed a rapid 
growth path as soon as conditions on the international capital market improved. By the 
end of 1998, however, when this market became more problematic again and Brazil (a 
major export destination) went into recession, there was a new downswing in GDP. 
From 1999 to 2001 the economic difficulties increased markedly. Following the great 
crisis of 2001 the macroeconomic regime changed and inflation rose noticeably. Since 
2002 Argentina experienced a steady and lasting economic recovery until 2008. 
 
The serious macroeconomic instability experienced since the mid-1970s is one of the 
explanation  for  the  significant  deterioration  in  labor  market  with  effects  on  wages, 
employment level and job quality, particularly for the lower skilled. Notwithstanding 
the  difficulties  that  faced  the  Argentinean  labor  market  during  the  nineties  and  the 
following decade –with unemployment levels around 9% in 1993 and 16% in 2003– 
informality  (including  self-employed and  precarious  salary  workers)  did  not  modify 
markedly its relative size. Instead, there was a marked advance in the share of non-
registered salaried workers which entirely explains the expansion –modest in relation to 
labor difficulties– of informal employment. The main feature shown by occupational 
structure  of  the  period  was,  then,  the  important  advance  of  non--registered  salaried 
workers  (controlling  the  incidence  of  domestic service  workers  and  beneficiaries of 
employment plans).  
 
It has to be taken into account that although unemployment insurance was introduced 
early in the 90’s, its coverage was very low. About 5 to 7% of the unemployed had 
access to the benefit. Basically, this was due to the reduced share of registered wage-
earners in the occupational structure, a condition to have access to the unemployment 
insurance.  
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Changes in the labour regulations also seem to have exerted some influence on the 
persistence of a high informality rate. During the period under analysis many changes 
have  been  implemented  with  the  purpose  of  altering  the  functioning  of  the  labour 
market. Indicatively, it must be emphasized that four national laws were passed from 
1991 to 2000. Most of them were inspired by the paradigm of labour flexibilization. 
Nevertheless, the employment growth was largely concentrated in non- registered jobs 
during the economic recovery (1996-1998). This evolution suggests that more flexible 
labour norms (such as the reduction in payroll taxes –1994–1 or the time extension of 
the trial period for new recruitments –1995–2) would have facilitated not the registration 
but instead the non-compliance with labour laws.  
 
According to the International Labour Office, informality can be seen as the incapacity 
of economy to create enough jobs compared to the labour force.  Thus, informal jobs are 
sometimes self-employment jobs and, in other cases, wage earners working in small 
units. According to this perspective, the informal unit is characterised by a no clear 
separation between capital and labour and usually acts in easy – entry activities and 
registers very low productivity. Alternatively, informality can be defined with the non 
compliance of labour regulations (mainly, evading taxes). However, the two definitions 
clearly overlap. In this paper, we combine both definitions as it is usual in the recent 
literature (see Hussmanns, 2005): workers in informal employment are those non-wage 
earners in small firms (i.e. firm with less than five workers), those evading taxes (i.e. 
non-registered wage earners) and workers in domestic service.3 The distinction between 
formal  and  informal employments  refers  to  the  main  occupation  (information  about 
secondary employments are not available). About 51,7% of the household heads are 
employed in the informal sector in 2003. (see Table 1). During the period 1996-2003 
informality  incidence  increased  2.7  p.p.  on  average.  This  aggregate  performance 
                                                
1 In 1994 it was passed a reduction in employer contributions for all workers of about 40% on average. 
2 In 1995 Law 24,465 included for the first time within the Employment Contract Law the trial-period. 
All  new  contracts  will  be  under  a  trial-period  during  the  first  3  months,  enabling  collective  labour 
agreement to extend the period to 6 months. Employer contributions to social security were eliminated 
during  this  period,  although  not  those  related  to  the  health  system.  The  impact  of  this  reform  was 
unambiguous and strong. There is agreement that since 1995, a vast majority of new recruitments in the 
formal sector of the economy were under a trial period. 
3 Informal employment should also include those beneficiaries of employment plans. These plans were 
implemented by the government in the second half of the nineties and may be identified in the data since 
2000. The universe under analyses is the group of households’ heads at least once employed. 
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combined an increase of non-registered wage earners and sharp decrease of registered 
workers in firms with more than five workers.  
 
During  the  same  period  poverty  increased  dramatically.4    Besides,  informality  rate 
among poor households was systematically higher indicating that those with informal 
jobs had lower probabilities of becoming non-poor. Similarly, the poverty rate among 
informal heads was also higher. From 1996 to 1998 overall poverty decreased although 
among  informal  households  poverty  incidence  rose  slightly.  Poor  households 
augmented markedly from 1998, both in informal and formal households.   
 
Poverty and informality trends reflect different dynamics: informality showed greater 
stability than poverty during the period under analysis. Indeed, the latter rose sharply 
accompanying macroeconomic fluctuations. Secondly, the higher value of the rate of 
informal jobs (compared to that of poverty) anticipates that a significant proportion of 
the  former  correspond  to  non-poor  households.  Both  pieces  of  evidence  justify  the 
research about interconnection of these phenomena. 
  
Table  2  gives  information  about  the  sample  composition  showing  differences  in 
attributes between male and female household heads. The share of female heads is 17%. 
Women show an average age slightly larger than males’ and run smaller households. 
The educational level was higher for women than for males while the hours worked and 
the employment rates were lower. The employment structure shows that male heads 
were highly concentrated in two categories: registered salary workers in firms with at 
least 6 employed people (44,6%) and non-wage earners in small firms (31,8%). Female 
heads  also  show  high  concentration  in  same  categories  than  male  but  with  high 
incidence of domestic service as well (23,9 %).  Finally, the probability of working in 
the informal sector was really greater for women than for men, while the risk of falling 
below  the  poverty  line  was  somewhat  lower.  Consequently,  households  headed  by 
women showed higher rates of both poverty and informality.  
 
                                                
4 We follow National Statistics and Census Institute’s (INDEC) methodology for identifying poverty. It 
consists  on  computing  the  number  of  equivalent  adults  for  each  household  and  then  computing  a 
monetary  poverty  line  also  for  each  family.  This  approach  accounts  for  households’  composition 
according to sex and age. Total household income is compared to that line and poor households become 
those with incomes below that value.   9
5. Econometric model 
Our aim is to analyze the relationship between two supposedly related concepts: poverty 
and informal employment. To do so, we use a dynamic random-effect bivariate probit 
model for the joint probability of experiencing the two states. The model allows for 
correlated unobserved heterogeneity and accounts for the initial conditions of the two 
processes. For an individual i, the risk of being in poverty at time t is expressed in terms 
of a latent variable 
*
1it y , as specified as in equation (1), while the risk of working in the 
informal sector in t is expressed by the latent variable 
*
2it y , specified in equation (2).  
 
it i t i t i it it u c y y x y 1 1 12 1 , 2 11 1 , 1 1
' *
1 + + + + = − − γ γ β             (1) 
it i t i t i it it u c y y x y 2 2 22 1 , 2 21 1 , 1 2
' *
2 + + + + = − − γ γ β            (2) 
[ ] 0 1
* > = jit jit y y ,   j = 1,2;        t = 2, . . . , T        (3) 
 
The dependent variables are the dummy indicators  it y1 (equal to one if the individual is 
at risk of poverty in t, and zero otherwise) and  it y2  (equal to one if individual i is 
employed in the informal sector in t, and zero otherwise).  In the model represented by 
(1)-(3),  it x  is a vector of independent variables, assumed to be strictly exogenous, and 
β =( 1 β , 2 β ) is the corresponding vector of parameters to be estimated. The errors terms 
it u1  and  it u2  are assumed to be independent over time and to follow a bivariate normal 
distribution,  with zero means,  unit  variances and cross-equation covariance  ρ . The 
model also includes individual random effects,  i c1  and  i c2 , assumed to be bivariate 
normal with variances 
2
1 c σ  and 
2
2 c σ  and covariance  1 c σ 2 c σ c ρ . We also assume that 
( i c1 ,  i c2 ), ( it u1 , it u2 ; t=1,…,T) and ( it x ; t=1,…,T) are independent (implying that  it x  is 
strictly exogenous). The dynamics of the model is here assumed to be first-order for 
simplicity. 
 
This dynamic  random-effects  model is well suited to tackle the issue of  “true state 
dependence”  and  to  study  dynamic  spillover  effects  from  poverty  to  informal 
employment and from informal employment to poverty. Therefore, we can establish the 
causal impact of past poverty on current poverty of past experiences in the informal   10
sector on current probability of working in the informal sector, once the confounding 
impact  due  to  unobserved  heterogeneity  is  accounted  for.  To  disentangle  between 
unobserved  heterogeneity  and  true  state  dependence,  the  lagged  dependent  variable, 
1 , 1 − t i y , is included in the poverty equation (1) and the lagged dependent variable  1 , 2 − t i y  
is included in the informal employment equation (2). Moreover, to take into account the 
spillover effects, the model also includes cross-effect lagged variables: lagged informal 
employment  1 , 2 − t i y  is included in the poverty equation and  lagged poverty  1 , 1 − t i y  is 
included  in  the  informal  employment  equation.  This  way  it  may  be  possible  to 
understand whether the correlation observed in the data between, say, y1,t-1 and y2t is due 
to correlated unobserved heterogeneity (i.e., ρc≠0) or rather to state dependence across 
poverty and informal employment (i.e., the spillover effects  12 γ  and  21 γ  are non-zero).  
 
To estimate the model we extend to the bivariate case the simple approach proposed by 
Wooldridge (2005) for univariate dynamic random effects probit models. Wooldridge 
(2005) proposes a Conditional Maximum Likelihood (CML) estimator that considers 
the distribution conditional on the initial values and the observed history of strictly 
exogenous  explanatory  variables.  To  generalize  this  approach  in  the  context  of  our 
bivariate probit model, we specify the individual specific effects  1 i c and  2 i c  given the 
initial  conditions  ( 1 1i y and  1 2i y )  and  the  time-constant  explanatory  variables  i x ,  as 
follows:  
      i i i i i a x y a y a a c 1 13
'
1 2 12 1 1 11 10 1 α + + + + =           
      i i i i i a x y a y a a c 2 23
'
1 2 22 1 1 21 20 2 α + + + + =  
       
where  j0 a ,  j1 a ,  j2 a   and  j3 a   (j=1,2)  are  parameters  to  be  estimated,  ( i 1 α , i 2 α )  are 

















α α α α
α σ
ρ σ σ σ
.       
   
Then after inserting in model (1)-(2) we obtain: 
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it i i i i t i t i it it
it i i i i t i t i it it
u a x y a y a a y y x y
u a x y a y a a y y x y
2 2 23
'





1 2 12 1 1 11 10 12 1 , 2 11 1 , 1 1
' *
1
+ + + + + + + + =
+ + + + + + + + =
− −
− −
α γ γ β
α γ γ β
    (4) 
 
Consistent  estimates  of  the  model’s  parameters  can  be  obtained  by  Conditional 
Maximum  Simulated  Likelihood  methods.  The  contribution  of  individual  i  to  the 
likelihood may be written as follow:  
 





− − Σ Φ =
T
t
i i i it t t it it it it it it
W d d g x x y y y y y y L
1
2 1 2 1 1 , 2 1 , 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 , , , ... , | ~ ~ , ~ , ~ α α α α ρ µ µ α  
   
where  it 1 µ and  it 2 µ  are the right-hand sides of equations in (4) excluding the error 
terms  it u1  and  it u2 , and  1 2 ~ − = jit jit y y for j=1,2.  
 
Finally note that, according to Wooldridge (2005), the model needs to be estimated on a 
balanced panel. Accordingly one may be worried that the estimator could potentially 
exacerbate attrition and sample selection present in the data. In fact, this is not the case, 
since  Wooldridge’s  method  has  some  advantages  in  facing  selection  and  attrition 
problems. In particular, as explained in Wooldridge (2005; pp.44), it allows selection 
and attrition to depend on the initial conditions and, therefore, it allows attrition to differ 
across initial levels of poverty and informality status. In particular, individuals with 
different initial statuses are allowed to have different missing data probabilities. Thus, 
we consider selection and attrition without explicitly modelling them as a function of 
the initial conditions. As a result, the analysis is less complicated and it compensates for 
the  potential  loss  of  information  from  using  a  balanced  panel.  Moreover,  in  the 
conditional MLE we can ignore any stratification that is a function of the initial level of 
deprivation  and  of  the  time-constant  explanatory  variables:  thus,  using  sampling 
weights would lead to an efficiency loss. 
 
6. Results 
In  this  section,  we  present  the  estimates  of  the  dynamic  model  for  poverty  and 
informality discussed in the previous section. In order to make the interpretation of the 
results easier, standard bivariate probit estimates are also presented. Results for male   12
and  female  household  heads  are  presented  separately.  See  Tables  3-4.  Covariates 
included in the vector xit refer to individual-level characteristics: gender, age (linear), 
dummies for high and medium education (low education is the reference category), 
marital status (=1 if married) and job attributes as tenure (linear), occupation (blue or 
white collars), sector dummies, area dummies and firm-size. These variables are treated 
as time-constant variables.5 Household-level characteristics are also included in xit: the 
number  of  the  household  members  and  the  number  of  working  members  of  the 
household. Only the latter varies over our period of analysis (thus, in the specification 
of the dynamic random effects model we also include the corresponding time-average 
variable in order to allow for correlation between the individual specific effects and the 
time varying variable). A set of period dummies is also included in the specification to 
capture  the  macroeconomic  environment.  In  both  equations,  the  same  explanatory 
variables are used.6 While in principle a wider set of influences may be considered, we 
have maintained our reduced-form specifications relatively parsimonious because (i) we 
are already controlling for (correlated) unobserved heterogeneity, (ii) the estimation of 
our  model  is  already  computationally  demanding.  More  importantly,  the  variables 
included in xit do not constitute the main focus of the analysis: this lies instead in the 
interrelated dynamics of poverty and informal sector employment, which is reflected in 
the estimates of the lagged indicators for both dependent variables 
 
The joint estimation of the model equations is necessary:  ρ  is positive and statistically 
significant  in  all  the  specifications  (both  for  male  and  female  household  heads). 
Therefore,  the  myriad  of  idiosyncratic  shocks  that,  at  any  given  time  period,  drive 
people into poverty and into informal sector employment have common elements.  The 
estimates of the pooled bivariate probit models do not control for individual unobserved 
heterogeneity and assumes that the initial conditions are exogenous. One would then 
expect  that  this  estimator  overestimate  the  importance  of  state  dependence,  as  the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable absorbs part of the effect that is instead due 
to (uncontrolled) unobserved heterogeneity. A quick glance at Tables 3-4 confirms that 
                                                
5  We observe no variability over the period of study (i.e. marital status) or very limited variability, so we 
decide to treat these variables as time constant to simplify the specification since the estimation of our 
model is already computationally demanding. 
6 The identification strategy relies upon the observed changes in an individual status of poverty and 
informal employment, which is convenient to our aims  given that the types  of exclusion restrictions 
normally used in the literature (e.g. Amuendo-Dorantes, 2004) did not hold in our case.   13
this is indeed the case. Therefore, the random effects bivariate probit model has to be 
preferred to the standard bivariate model.  
 
Male Household Heads: random effect bivariate probit model 
Estimates  for  male  household  heads  are  reported  in  Table  3.7  For  poverty,  after 
controlling  for  unobserved  heterogeneity,  the  lag  coefficient  is  still  statistically 
significant and it is estimated at 0.3; the lag cross effect is also sizeable: it is estimated 
at 0.2 in the poverty equation. For informal sector employment, own lag estimate is 
even higher, at 0.6, and the lag cross-effect is estimated at 0.1.  
 
In both equations the initial values are also very important, and this implies that there is 
substantial correlation between the initial condition and the unobserved heterogeneity. 
For poverty, the coefficient on initial poverty (1.4) is much larger that the coefficient on 
the lag (0.3), while the coefficient on initial informal sector employment is statistically 
not  different  from  the  coefficient  on  the  cross-lag  (0.2).  For  informal  sector 
employment, the coefficient on initial informal sector employment (3.05) is much larger 
than the coefficient on the lag (0.6); the coefficient on initial poverty (0.2) is also larger 
than the coefficient on the cross-lag (0.1). 
 
The standard deviations of the random effects are statistically significant and positive 
for  both  poverty  and  informal  sector  employment.  This  means  that  unobserved 
heterogeneity  plays  a  role  in  explaining  the  observed  persistence  in  poverty  and 
informal sector employment.  
 
High values of coefficients (of initial condition and on the lag event) in the informality 
equation  reveal  the  segmented  nature  of  labor  market.  These  figures  show  that 
probabilities of leaving informality are very low for male heads. Instead, the values of 
similar  coefficients  in  poverty  equation  may  be  interpreted  as  indicative  of  a  more 
flexible pattern. This is an expected evolution since poverty transitions in the short run 
usually  derive  from  income  changes  that  are  closely  related  to  macroeconomic 
fluctuations. We have already mentioned that the informality rate showed great stability 
all along the period while the incidence of poverty fluctuated according to the economic   14
performance.  Consequently  the  observed  cross-lag  effects  were  of  low  intensity 
although robust. 
 
Individuals with high-medium education have a lower risk of being in poverty than 
those with low education. Age, entered linearly for simplicity, has a small negative and 
statistically significant effect on income poverty, reflecting the increased command on 
economic resources as the individual ages. However, age has an opposite effects on 
informal sector employment indicating that older workers have more possibilities of 
working  in  the  informal  sector  than  younger  workers.  This  is  consistent  with  two 
complementary  hypotheses.  Firstly,  firms  would  prefer  to  register  younger  workers. 
Secondly,  older  people  would  exhibit  a  larger  entrepreneurial  spirit  that  younger 
workers.  The number of working members in the household decreases the probability 
of  being  in  poverty,  while  the  average  number  of  working  members  increases  the 
probabilities  of  working  in  the  informal  sector.  A  possible  explanation  for  this 
correlation is the presence of barriers that limit access to formal jobs for spouses and 
other  members.  It  may  reflect  also  strong  social  networks  in  the  informal  sphere. 
Conversely, the risk of poverty increases with the number of the household members. 
Blue collar workers have higher probabilities of being poor than white collar workers, 
while  workers  with  long  tenure  have  low  probabilities  of  being  poor.  Individuals 
working in small firms have both high probabilities of being poor and being employed 
in the informal sector. This is a common feature of Latin American labor markets where 
small firms tend to have low productivity and concentrate a great proportion of non-
registered  workers.  Finally,  differences  in  the  probabilities  of  being  poor  and/or 
employed in the informal sector are observed across individuals working in different 
sectors and different regions.  
 
Female Household Heads: dynamic bivariate random effect model 
Estimates  for  female  household  heads  are  reported  in  Table  4.8  For  poverty,  after 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, the lag coefficient is estimated at 0.4 and the 
lag cross effect is estimated at 0.6. For informal sector employment, own lag estimate is 
at 0.8, and the lag cross-effect is estimated at 0.4. In both equations, the coefficients on 
                                                                                                                                          
7  The reference group is composed by single low educated males living in Great Buenos Aires, working 
in manufacture as white collars in medium-large sized firms.   15
the lag and the cross-lag are larger than the ones observed in Table 3 for male household 
heads.  
 
In  both  equations  the  initial  values  are,  once  again,  very  important  pointing  to  the 
existence of substantial correlation between the initial condition and the unobserved 
heterogeneity. For poverty, the coefficient on initial poverty is estimated at 1.2 and the 
coefficient on initial informal sector employment is estimated at 0.3. For informal sector 
employment, the coefficient on initial informal sector employment is estimated at 2.8 
and the coefficient on initial poverty at 0.5. Thus, we find some evidence that cross-lag 
effects are stronger for female household heads than for males. High concentration of 
female heads in domestic service may be part of the explanation. It must be emphasized 
that this activity has low barriers to entry/exit and low monthly income. In the same 
direction  the  fact  that  female  heads  (usually  in  charge  of  little  children)  face  low 
opportunities of getting high-quality jobs (i.e. more stable) might also influence this 
stronger relationship. 
 
The standard deviations of the random effects are statistically significant and positive 
for both poverty and informal sector employment. However, unobserved heterogeneity 
seems to play a slightly smaller role in explaining the observed persistence in poverty 
and informal sector employment for female household heads than for male household 
heads.  In facts, in both equations, the standard deviations result to be slightly smaller 
for female household heads than for male household heads. 
 
Individuals with high-medium education have a lower risk of being in poverty than 
those with low education. Unexpected, age does not have a significant effect on poverty. 
The number of working members in the household decreases the probability of being in 
poverty, while the average number of working members increases the probabilities of 
working in the informal sector (one again point in the direction of presence of barriers 
that  limit  access  to  a  formal  jobs  and/or  the  existence  of  strong  social  networks). 
Conversely, the risk of poverty increases with the number of the household members. 
There are no significant differences in the probabilities of being poor between blue and 
white collar workers, and between female workers in small or large sized firms. But, 
                                                                                                                                          
8 The reference group is composed by single low educated females living in Great Buenos Aires, working   16
females  working  in  small  firms  have  high  probabilities  of  being  employed  in  the 
informal sector. Workers with long tenure have low probabilities of being poor, while 
employment in informal sector is associated with shorter tenures than employment in 
the  formal  sector.  Finally,  differences  in  the  probabilities  of  being  poor  and/or 
employed  in  the  informal  sector  are  observed  across  females  working  in  different 
sectors and different regions.  
 
Predicted probabilities: male versus female probabilities  
For both equations, the lagged dependent variables concerning poverty and informal 
sector employment are significantly positive. To evaluate the relevance of the dynamics 
in  the  model,  we  estimate  the  predicted  probabilities  of  being  in  poverty,  and  for 
working in the informal sector, for various lagged statuses of poverty-informal sector 
employment (Table 5). As suggested by Wooldridge (2005), predicted probabilities are 
first  computed  at  individual  characteristics,  keeping  lagged  dependent  variables  at 
specified  values,  and  then  averaged  in  the  sample.  The  estimated  parameters 
corresponding to each variable in Xit=(xit, y1i,t-1, y2i,t-1, y1jit-2,  y2jit-2) are multiplied by 
( )
2 / 1 2 ˆ 1
−
+ j σ , for j=1,2, so as take into account the estimated distribution of unobserved 
heterogeneity, and the corresponding linear predictions are inserted into the cumulative 
standard normal distribution function, separately for each equation.  
 
For male household heads, the probability of being poor in t is about 0.25 for those who 
were non-poor and not-employed in the informal sector in t-1. This probability increases 
to 0.18 for female household workers. However, the same probability is larger, at 0.23, 
if the female household  head  was  poor the  year before, albeit not employed  in the 
informal sector. The probability is 0.29 if we look to male household heads poor the 
year before if not-employed in the informal sector. For females and males, both poor 
and employed in the informal sector in t-1, the chances of being poor in t raise further, 
at about 0.32.  
 
For  male  and  female  household  heads,  the  probabilities  of  working  in  the  informal 
sector are about 0.42, if the household head was non-poor and not-employed in the 
informal sector in t-1. These probabilities are higher (respectively, at 0.495 and 0.509), 
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if the household head was employed in the informal sector the year before, albeit not 
poor. For those both poor and employed in the informal sector in t-1, the chances of 
working in the informal sector in t slightly increase, respectively, at about 0.507 and 
0.551.  
 
These results are compatible with the presence of barriers along the informal/formal line 
in labor market. In contrast, past episodes of poverty did not have similar effects (on 
future events) in the case of households ruled by male heads. This suggests that income 
fluctuations of households located above / below the poverty line were widespread. 
Female heads, instead, showed positive effects from past poverty episodes. Cross-lag 
effects from poverty to informality were observed and give support to the hypothesis of 
informality as non-voluntary (as an alternative to unemployment). In contrast, informal 
cross-lag effects were obtained only for households headed by women in line with the 
explanation already mentioned about the higher difficulties they face in labor market. 
 
7. Sample selection issues 
In this section, we discuss the impact of eventual sample selection problems deriving 
from the fact that the model is estimated only on wage and salary workers. The male 
population  (aged  16-65)  is  composed  as  following:  81.42%  employed,  7.92% 
unemployed  and  10.66%  inactive  men  (7.25%  retired,  0.3%  renter,  0.87%  student; 
0.65% disables, 1.59% others). The female population (aged 16-65) is composed as 
following:  56.71%  employed,  6.43%  unemployed  and    36.86%  inactive  women 
(18.79%  retired,  0.92%  renter,  2.78%  student;  13.67%  housewife,  0.31%  disables, 
0.39% others). To correct for any selection bias in moving from the entire population to 
the working individuals, we compute a Mills ratio using a selection variables that equals 
1 at period t if the individual is observed over the entire period of analysis and works in 
period t (Clark and Etilé, 2006). We estimated selection equations separately on the 
male  and  female  populations,  as  function  of  age,  education,  a  dummy  variable 
indicating whether the respondent is attending school, marital status, household size, 
number of working household members, number of children younger than 6 years old, 
regional dummies and period dummies. The selection equations are identified by the 
exclusion of the dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is attending school 
and by the exclusion of the number of children under the age of 6 in the household from 
the  structural  equations  (similar  instruments  have  been  previous  used  by  Amuedo-  18
Dorantes, 2004). Both of these variables are not significant in the structural equations 
once we account for the worker’s skill through occupation dummies and for family size. 
Results  from  selection  regressions  and  from  the  random  effect  bivariate  model  are 
available on request. Table 5 shows the predicted probabilities of being in poverty, and 
for  working  in  the  informal  sector,  for  various  lagged  statuses  of  poverty-informal 
sector employment. Results are robust with the ones presented above  
 
 
8. Conclusions  
In this paper we have studied the determinants of poverty and informal employment 
using recent panel data from Argentina. In particular we aimed at uncovering a mutually 
causal relationship between household poverty and household heads’ employment in the 
informal  sector,  a  relationship  that  has  attracted  the  interest  of  both  academic 
researchers and policy makers. The analysis uses a bivariate dynamic random effect 
probit model to account for the endogeneity of household poverty and household heads’ 
employment  in  the  informal  sector.  Our  model  provides  a  means  of  assessing  the 
persistence over time of poverty and informal employment at the individual level, while 
controlling  for  both  observed  and  unobserved  determinants  of  the  two  processes. 
Moreover, the model accommodates the potential existence of spillover effects from 
past poverty to current informality status and from past informality to current poverty 
status. These dynamic spillover effects might be crucial determinants of the persistence 
of both poverty and informality that have not been previously studied in the literature.  
 
Our results from Argentina show that indeed poverty and informal employment are 
highly persistent processes at the individual level. Moreover, statistically significant and 
positive spillover effects are found running both from past poverty to current informal 
employment and from past informality to current poverty status, corroborating the view 
that the two processes are also shaped by interrelated dynamics in segmented labor 
markets.  Thus, our results seem to support the view of jobs in the informal sector as a 
demand-led and second-choice type of employment to which household heads turn as 
they find it difficult to cover minimum household needs, as in the case of households 
poverty.  
   19
The  involuntary  nature  of  informality  should  indeed  be  worrisome  for  the  policy 
makers: not only is the status of informality a second-choice type of employment, but it 
is also highly persistence (and, therefore, it is hardly identifiable as “port of entry” to 
formal  employment)  and  it  has,  on  average,  unpleasant  poverty  implications.  These 
concerns need to be addressed in future labor negotiations, particularly with the share of 
non-registered salaried workers on the rise. Better access to capital, better labor-market 
institutions, efforts in “formalizing” non-registered salaried workers, policies to enhance 
firm  productivity  and  policies  aimed  at  improving  human  capital  and  individual 
productivity  (e.g.  training  programs)  could  expand  workers’  opportunities  for 
advancement, breaking the informality trap and leading to an improvement in families’ 
well-being. Well-designed income transfer schemes for poorer households are instead 
an important measure to help households move out of poverty (breaking the poverty 
trap). 
  
Breaking the informality and the poverty traps may not be enough if some individual 
characteristics strongly increase the individual probabilities to re-enter in the negative 
status and, therefore, being trapped in it once again. Our results show that observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity matter in determining the probability of being poor and/or 
working in the informal sector. Therefore, the identification of the groups having high 
risks of being poor and/or of working in the informal sector naturally provides strategic 
information  to  design  public  policies  oriented  to  alleviate  poverty  and  improving 
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Table 1. Employment Structure and Poverty: all urban areas  
 % heads of households  May-96  Oct-98  Oct-01  May-03 
Formal Employment         
Non-wage earners (firm size >5)  2.0  1.6  1.6  1.1 
Registered wage earners (firm size >5)  42.1  40.5  38.9  34.0 
Registered wage earners (firm size <=5)  6.8  6.3  6.0  5.5 
          
Informal Employment         
Non-wage earners (firm size <=5)  30.2  29.1  30.2  29.4 
Non-registered wage earners (firm size >5)  6.9  9.3  7.8  8.6 
Non-registered wage earners (firm size <=5)  7.4  8.6  9.2  8.4 
Domestic service  4.5  4.8  4.8  5.2 
Employment Plans      1.5  7.7 
          
Informal Employment (1)         
Overall  49  51.7  52  51.7 
Poor households  62.5  70.1  71.6  69.9 
          
Absolute Poverty incidence         
Overall  22.1  21.8  28.3  42.8 
Head of Household informal  25  27.2  35.8  54.9 
(1) Excluding Employment Plans 
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Table 2. Sample composition: all urban areas 
 
Heads of households (ever employed)  Female  Male  Total 
Sex (%)  17  83  100 
       
Age (mean)  47  44  44 
       
Household Size   2,9  4,1  3,9 
       
Education (%)       
Low  60  65  64 
Medium  25  26  26 
High  14  10  10 
Total  100  100  100 
       
Employment rate (%)  79,8  89,6  87,9 
       
Hours worked a week (mean)  33  44  43 
       
Employment Structure (Obs. 1) (%)       
   Formal Employment       
   Non-wage earners (firm size >5)  0,5  1,9  1,7 
   Registered wage earners (firm size >5)  39,0  44,6  43,7 
   Registered wage earners (firm size <=5)  5,2  6,2  6,1 
       
   Informal employment (1)       
   Non-wage earners (firm size <=5)  19,4  31,8  29,9 
   Non-registered wage earners (firm size >5)  6,5  7,7  7,5 
   Non-registered wage earners (firm size <=5)  5,6  7,4  7,1 
   Domestic service  23,9  0,5  4,1 
          
       
Informal Employment (%)       
Obs 1  55,4  47,3  48,6 
Obs 2  54,8  47,5  48,6 
Obs 3  55,1  48,0  49,1 
Obs 4  55,6  48,5  49,6 
                             
Poverty Incidence (%)       
Obs 1  29,5  30,1  30,0 
Obs 2  31,2  32,5  32,3 
Obs 3  32,6  34,0  33,7 
Obs 4  32,7  34,8  34,4 
                             
Both Informal and Poor (%)       
Obs 1  15,6  14,1  14,4 
Obs 2  15,8  14,9  15,1 
Obs 3  17,9  15,9  16,2 
Obs 4  17,4  16,5  16,7 
                             
N  4844  23621  28465 
(1) Employment plans are included in the category “Non-registered wage earners”.   24
Table 3. Male household heads: estimates 
(only male household 
heads)     Poverty    Informality     Poverty    Informality 
  Coef    
Robust 
SE  Coef    
Robust 
SE  Coef    
Robust 
SE  Coef    
Robust 
SE 
poor in t-1  1.3257  **  0.0269  0.1700  **  0.0284  0.3446  **  0.0472  0.1088  *  0.0670 
informal in t-1  0.2896  **  0.0286  2.1882  **  0.0299  0.2074  **  0.0748  0.5859  **  0.0634 
Poor at t0  No    No  No    No  1.4299  **  0.0658  0.2150  **  0.0737 
Informal at t0  No    No  No    No  0.2031  **  0.0783  3.0479  **  0.1438 
Age  -0.0022    0.0012  0.0068  **  0.0012  -0.0042  **  0.0020  0.0108  **  0.0026 
Married  -0.0198    0.0551  -0.0476    0.0475  -0.0153    0.0849  -0.0619    0.1018 
household size  0.2703  **  0.0079  -0.0106    0.0069  0.3790  **  0.0146  -0.0199    0.0155 
No. of working hh 
members   -0.5872  **  0.0183  0.0552  **  0.0152  -0.8814  **  0.0404  0.0234    0.0472 
high education  -0.9426  **  0.0607  0.1013  *  0.0393  -1.3405  **  0.0925  0.1419    0.0810 
Medium education  -0.5201  **  0.0264  -0.0034    0.0242  -0.7221  **  0.0450  -0.0268    0.0538 
Tenure  -0.0009  **  0.0001  -0.0007  **  0.0001  -0.0012  **  0.0002  -0.0009  **  0.0002 
Blue collar  0.1194  **  0.0312  0.0778  *  0.0307  0.1978  **  0.0531  0.0741    0.0677 
Construction  0.2552  **  0.0343  0.3153  **  0.0366  0.3378  **  0.0580  0.5227  **  0.0805 
Domestic service and 
commerce  0.0764  *  0.0375  0.0725  *  0.0351  0.1144  *  0.0624  0.1063    0.0792 
Transport  -0.0908  *  0.0429  0.1764  **  0.0402  -0.1071    0.0729  0.2913  **  0.0904 
Modern services  0.0883    0.0486  -0.0690    0.0436  0.1483  *  0.0820  -0.2617  **  0.1000 
Social services  0.1042  **  0.0392  -0.4216  **  0.0407  0.1458  **  0.0660  -0.7279  **  0.0905 
Public sector  -0.1349  *  0.0573  -0.0475    0.0465  -0.2259  **  0.0968  -0.1503    0.1035 
firm sized: small  0.1030  **  0.0285  0.6832  **  0.0236  0.1383  **  0.0504  0.7928  **  0.0646 
Area is Pampeana  0.1422  **  0.0342  0.0360    0.0311  0.1688  **  0.0572  0.1020    0.0695 
Area is Cuyo  0.3066  **  0.0395  -0.0006    0.0372  0.3987  **  0.0653  -0.0470    0.0820 
Area is Noa  0.4493  **  0.0352  0.0911  **  0.0342  0.6168  **  0.0599  0.1271  *  0.0748 
Area is Pantagonia  -0.1990  **  0.0412  -0.0746  *  0.0357  -0.3075  **  0.0667  -0.1032    0.0792 
Area is Nea  0.5651  **  0.0395  0.1001  *  0.0400  0.7826  **  0.0688  0.1863  **  0.0877 
Period dummies  yes    yes  yes    yes  yes    yes  yes    yes 
No. of working hh 
members (longitudinal 
average)  no    No  no    no  0.0548    0.0492  0.0980  *  0.0603 
Constant  -1.6071  **  0.0941  -1.7895  **  0.0899  -2.1600  **  0.1465  -2.8160  **  0.1887 
                                      
ρ           0.1673  **  0.0195           0.2081  **  0.0417 
Log-pseudo likelihood             -17440                 -16532 
No. Obs             29763             29763 
No. Clusters                 9921                 9921 
σa1                          1.3319  **  0.0634 
σa2                      0.9664  **  0.0414 
ρa                             0.1467  **  0.0474 
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Table 4. Female household heads: estimates 
(only female 
household heads)     Poverty    Informality     Poverty    Informality 
  Coef    
Robust 
SE  Coef    
Robust 
SE  Coef    
Robust 
SE  Coef    
Robust 
SE 
poor in t-1  1.279  **  0.064  0.407  **  0.083  0.4248  **  0.1105  0.4284  **  0.1818 
informal in t-1  0.653  **  0.083  2.397  **  0.082  0.6033  **  0.2094  0.8679  **  0.1803 
Poor at t0  no    No  no    no  1.2271  **  0.1467  0.5281  **  0.2085 
Informal at t0  no    No  no    no  0.2754    0.2186  2.8748  **  0.4142 
Age  -0.004    0.003  0.007  *  0.003  -0.0052    0.0047  0.0128  *  0.0065 
Married  -0.011    0.064  -0.030    0.066  -0.0480    0.1014  -0.0027    0.1391 
household size  0.346  **  0.022  -0.055  **  0.020  0.4767  **  0.0410  -0.1467  **  0.0469 
No. of working hh 
members   -0.700  **  0.052  0.103  *  0.051  -1.0570  **  0.1098  -0.1800    0.1422 
high education  -0.762  **  0.108  0.035    0.087  -1.0717  **  0.1607  0.0919    0.1688 
Medium education  -0.464  **  0.067  -0.241  **  0.067  -0.7544  **  0.1141  -0.3951  **  0.1430 
Tenure  -0.001  *  0.000  -0.001  **  0.000  -0.0011  **  0.0005  -0.0020  **  0.0007 
Blue collar  -0.038    0.160  0.232    0.143  0.0206    0.2693  0.2100    0.3441 
Construction  -0.209    0.440  0.053    0.575  -0.2299    0.5477  0.1317    0.8350 
Domestic service and 
commerce  -0.156    0.151  0.216    0.128  -0.1439    0.2411  0.1551    0.2910 
Transport  -0.381    0.232  -0.079    0.234  -0.3755    0.4038  -0.1026    0.4297 
Modern services  -0.363    0.157  -0.262    0.133  -0.4778  *  0.2589  -0.7262  **  0.3107 
Social services  -0.069    0.148  -0.462  **  0.131  -0.0701    0.2496  -0.8639  **  0.3051 
Public sector  -0.230    0.205  -0.319  *  0.156  -0.3104    0.3096  -0.6723  *  0.3439 
firm sized: small  0.009    0.089  0.685  **  0.068  -0.0782    0.1410  0.9602  **  0.1807 
Area is Pampeana  0.304  **  0.098  -0.228  **  0.082  0.4464  **  0.1488  -0.3909  **  0.1766 
Area is Cuyo  0.387  **  0.110  -0.169    0.107  0.6159  **  0.1750  -0.2193    0.2146 
Area is Noa  0.477  **  0.098  -0.145    0.090  0.6812  **  0.1528  -0.3341  *  0.1915 
Area is Pantagonia  -0.161    0.111  -0.400  **  0.091  -0.2408    0.1654  -0.6037  **  0.2072 
Area is Nea  0.619  **  0.106  -0.104    0.105  0.8567  **  0.1731  -0.1776    0.2341 
Period dummies  yes    yes  yes    yes  yes    yes  yes    yes 
No. of working hh 
members (longitudinal 
average)  no    No  no    no  0.1000    0.1342  0.5380  **  0.1829 
Constant  -1.287  **  0.228  -1.444  **  0.252  -1.7797  **  0.3811  -2.3376  **  0.4748 
                                      
ρ           0.331  **  0.053           0.4957  **  0.1309 
Log-pseudo likelihood                 -2673.21                 -2539.27 
No. Obs             5718             5718 
No. Clusters                 1906                 1906 
σa1                        1.2198  **  0.1803 
σa2                      0.8911  **  0.0958 
ρa                             0.1660     0.1290   26
Table 5. 
Probabilities     
 
Probability of status in t 
  
Probability of status 
in t-1 
  
Random-effect bivariate probit model 
Random-effect bivariate probit model with 
IV  Pooled bivariate probit model 
t-1     Males  Female  Males  Female  Males  Female 
Poor 
Informal 
sector  Poor 
Informal 
sector  Poor 
Informal 
sector  Poor 
Informal 
sector  Poor 
Informal 
sector  Poor 
Informal 
sector  Poor 
Informal 
sector 
0  0  0.145  0.138  0.0957  0.1299  0.24836  0.42711  0.1787  0.4248  0.24543  0.42696   0.17723  0.42276 
1  0  0.475  0.173  0.3584  0.2151  0.29644  0.4396  0.2308  0.4662  0.29546    0.44273  0.25123  0.45188 
0  1  0.2  0.802  0.203  0.7942  0.2767  0.4946  0.2554  0.5085  0.27833  0.49494  0.23077  0.50726 
1  1  0.562  0.844  0.555  0.8765  0.32775  0.5073  0.3205  0.5513  0.33197   0.51099  0.31789  0.53704 
 
  
 